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Abstract Let it be granted that Buddhism has, e.g., in its logical literature,
detailed canons and explicit rules of right reason that, amongst other things, ban
inconsistency as irrational. This is the normative dimension of how people should
think according to many major Buddhist authors. But do important Buddhist writers
ever recognize any interesting or substantive role for inconsistency and forms of
irrationality in their account of how people actually do think and act? The article
takes as its point of departure a recurring theme in the writings of the 8th Century
Indian Buddhist thinker, S´a¯ntideva, who subjects his own behaviour and thought to
minute scrutiny in argumentation with himself, only to be puzzled at his own
seemingly irrational persistence in ways of thinking that he knows to be wrong and
actions that he knows to be worse courses. The Buddhist’s situation is profitably
comparable to issues of akrasia, weakness of the will, that are taken up by Plato,
Aristotle and many modern philosophers, including notably Donald Davidson and
David Wiggins.
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What do we mean by rationality? We often tend to reach for a characterization in formal terms.
Rationality can be seen as logical consistency, for instance. We can call someone irrational who
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affirms both p and not-p. By extension, someone who acts flagrantly in violation of his own
interests, or of his own avowed objectives, can be considered irrational (Taylor 1982, p. 97)1
What is special in incontinence is that the actor cannot understand himself: he recognizes, in his
own intentional behaviour, something essentially surd (Davidson 1980, p. 42)
‘‘Why do I do the things that make me sorry?’’
(Lyle Lovett, ‘‘Who Loves you Better than I?’’)
1 Irrationality and Akrasia
One of the ways to understand positions better on the nature and scope of reason is
to look at the role, if any, they accord to irrationality in human thought and action.
In the case of Buddhism, it is obvious that there is a great deal in the philosophical,
doctrinal and ethical literature that testifies to highly developed norms of rationality.
We regularly find scholastic authors of various Buddhist schools advocating the
strict exclusion of contradiction as a canon of right reason: contradiction is said to
be a dos:a, a fault in thought or speech, and a nigrahastha¯na, a point of defeat in a
debate. Let us speak of a kind of ‘‘standard conception of rationality’’2, which is
widespread in Buddhism, especially in its later Indo-Tibetan varieties heavily
influenced by the Buddhist logical literature, but is also frequently presented in
Western sources as a kind of rudimentary intuitive account of what it is to be
rational. (It is what I have given above in the quotation from an article by Charles
Taylor.) Buddhists sometimes formulate this standard conception in very strong
terms: in a famous passage in the Prasannapada¯, the sixth-century Indian author,
Candrakı¯rti, says that when an opponent worthy to debate with (&rational) has been
persuaded that his own position is riddled with contradictions, he will give it up.
Someone who does not do so is said to be unmattaka, ‘‘out of his mind,’’
1 Note that ‘‘rational’’ is often used, inter alia, to describe what is simply based on reasoning, be that
reasoning more or less sound or unsound, good or bad; or it is used to qualify beings that are endowed
with the capacity to engage in reasoning. The adjective is also, of course, as in the passage from Charles
Taylor, used in a normative and evaluative sense, to characterize thinking, speech, behaviour, etc. that are
in keeping with good reasoning. In what follows, we are using the term in that latter sense. This is close to
the use of the Sanskrit terms such as yukta/nya¯yya and their Tibetan and Chinese translations rigs pa,
cheng li, etc. Cf., however, van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004, pp. 123–125), where the use of the term
‘‘rational’’ is stipulatively limited to the first sense and the term ‘‘reasonable’’ is reserved for the good
uses of reason.
2 There may be, e.g., in certain early Buddhist texts, and perhaps in certain Chan texts, non-standard
conceptions which have a greater tolerance of inconsistency. That would need a separate treatment and
I’m not going to delve into such issues here; accordingly my focus will be upon the ‘‘standard
conception.’’ There is in any case no doubt that many Buddhists do profess a standard conception of
reason where avoidance of contradiction is an explicitly invoked iron-clad rule: it is abundantly attested in
their own philosophical theories, their canons of debate (va¯da) and in their polemical refutations of
adversaries.
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‘‘demented,’’ and hence not worth arguing with.3 On this ‘‘standard conception’’,
then, at least a necessary condition for people to be rational is that they strive to be
consistent; thus acquiescence in, or worse, willing espousal of inconsistency will
accordingly be considered to be irrational.
Now, in Western thought there is an old conundrum that is often linked to the
problem of irrationality: this is the philosophical problem, originating in Plato’s
Protagoras and in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, of akrasia, i.e., weakness of the
will, incontinence, the fact that people often seem to act contrary to what they think
or know to be best. Potential examples of weakness of the will are familiar to all and
abound, from giving free rein to anger that one knows to be senseless to going on
and on in seamy relationships while having only deep pessimism about the probable
outcomes. And there are interesting philosophical consequences if such weakness is
acknowledged: many socio-economic or ethical theories, including some popular
Buddhist teachings on ethics (see e.g. Ricard 2006), take it as more or less a given
that people act in a way that they are convinced will further happiness and diminish
pain, be it their own or that of others: if akrasia is to be taken into account seriously,
pursuit of maximal utility will be at most an idealized or simplified model, one that
may well be false in describing the actual complex features of people’s behaviour.4
Finally, akratic behaviour is often taken as having an epistemic counterpart too:
we can know that that such and such a view is wrong or false, but nonetheless
somehow believe in it just as if we thought it true (see e.g. Hookway 2001). Wishful
thinking is an easy example; various sophisticated and seductive self-deceptions are
more interesting potential cases of an epistemic version of akrasia. The problem is
not just treated in works of philosophy or ethics: certain great works of literature, like
Gustave Flaubert’s Madame Bovary, explore such forms of self-deception5; most of
the famous case-studies of mauvaise foi which Jean-Paul Sartre so penetratingly
analysed in Being and Nothingness are also arguably types of akrasia. In short, an
akrates is convinced that p is best and yet acts as if he in some sense believes in not-p;
he strongly thinks that p is true and yet also somehow accepts not-p. Akrasia is thus
often seen as a type of irrationality, or dangerously close to irrationality, given the
standard conception of a rational person not acquiescing in, knowingly accepting or
promoting inconsistency.
Do Buddhists recognize any important role for akrasia in their account of how
average, sane, people think and act? Let us from here on put the moral and epistemic
together and just speak of the problem of akrasia taken in both fashions. Of course,
3 Candrakirti, Prasannapada¯, ed. de la Valle´e Poussin (1970: 15.9–10): atha sva¯bhyupagamavirodh-
acodanaya¯pi paro na nivartate, tada¯pi nirlajjataya¯ hetudr: s: t: a¯nta¯bhya¯m api naiva nivarteta / na
conmattakena saha¯sma¯kam: viva¯da iti. ‘‘But if the opponent did not desist even when confronted with a
contradiction in his own position, then too, as he would have no shame, he would not desist at all even
because of a logical reason and example. Now, as it is said, for us there is no debate with someone who is
out of his mind.’’
4 The falsity of theories that explain behaviour only in terms of maximizing utility/happiness is the
consequence that David Wiggins draws from akrasia. See Wiggins (1998).
5 Emma Bovary’s persuading herself that she would be swept off her feet by her lover and her
elaborating numerous other romantic scenarios about love and even her own sainthood, all the while
knowing they were not so, can be regarded as case studies of epistemic akrasia. Such is the analysis in
Davidson (2004b).
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Buddhists do recognize that people act and think in ways that they later realize to be
wrong, or even hopelessly incoherent—indeed this is a sad fact of life that virtually
everyone is forced to admit at some time or another. But do they recognize that
people act and think akratically, i.e., believing things and acting in certain fashions,
while at the same time in some sense aware of being inconsistent with their own
better judgment and intentionally pursuing worse courses of action?
Issues of self-deception and epistemic akrasia have been taken up in connection
with Chinese, Japanese and Indian thinkers by Roger Ames, Elliot Deutsch and
others; Richard Hayes has also seen the interest of the problem in Buddhism, all the
while acknowledging, as I do, that there is no treatment of it as an explicitly
formulated philosophical theme in classical Buddhist writings.6 My starting point
and the work to which I return again and again is the Bodhicarya¯vata¯ra of S´a¯ntideva
(7–8th century CE), where, I would argue, the problem underlies the discussion in
several chapters, sometimes at almost every turn. The problem comes out especially
urgently in S´a¯ntideva’s self-analyses—instead of the non-conceptual quietism often
associated nowadays with Buddhism, his practice clearly involves penetrating and
relentless argumentation with himself.7 And though the present analysis can be seen
as an extended meditation on S´a¯ntideva’s tortured auto-interrogation, there are other
Buddhist contexts in which the problem seems to figure significantly. That said, a
theme such as this is not primarily pursued by giving textual data from Sanskrit or
other Asian language writings; it involves considerable interpretation and exegesis.
The debt to the writings of Donald Davidson, David Wiggins and to the
contemporary literature on akrasia and self-deception will become obvious.
2 Pure Rationality
To say, seemingly against the evidence, that it is utterly impossible that people act
intentionally against their better judgment is to accept a version of what Donald
Davidson has called a ‘‘doctrine of pure rationality’’, whose first clear statement in
the West goes back to Socrates in Plato’s Protagoras (see Davidson 2004b, pp. 174–
175). Here is how Aristotle summarized that view in Book 7 of the Nicomachean
Ethics (cited in Wiggins 1998):
One may be puzzled how a man with a correct view of a situation can be weak of will. For some
deny that this is possible if he really knows what is the right thing to do. For if the knowledge is
present, it is strange, as Socrates thought, for something else to overcome knowledge and
manhandle it like a slave. Socrates was totally opposed to that view. He denied that there was any
such thing as weakness of will. For knowing that it is best, nobody, he said, acts contrary to the
best. If he does act contrary to the best, it must be through ignorance. This account of Socrates
conflicts plainly with what seems to be the case and what people say…
6 Although my analysis differs from that of Hayes (1996), I do agree with him on the importance, in this
connection, of the Buddhist’s theory of personal identity and ‘‘modularization’’ of the self. See Sect. 7
below.
7 On Buddhist quietism and the role for argumentation, including argumentation with oneself, see our
introduction to this volume.
152 T. J. F. Tillemans
123
In short, a pure rationalist holds that when we pursue worse courses we don’t
actually know what is right, and if we did, we invariably would think and act
correctly. If this was also the Buddhist position, then the Buddhist might well see
people as being as exclusively rational as did Socrates. As we shall see in Sect. 4,
there is a Buddhist account that goes in that Socratic direction, one that has had a
certain success in popular presentations. Another textually supported account,
taking seriously themes of some major Buddhist authors, does not.
3 Buddhist Sources Suggestive of Akrasia
David Wiggins began a long article on akrasia with the following astute
observation: the existence of weakness of the will is not contested by ordinary
non-theoretical people; it is a problem for theoreticians of rationality because they
cannot see how it could exist and, especially, because they cannot see how it could
be compatible with the other theories they espouse. Indeed I suspect that many non-
philosophers, if asked, would reply (echoing Lyle Lovett) that we do sometimes, or
even very often, intentionally do things that we know will make us terribly sorry, in
short that we pursue worse courses and are deeply puzzled as to what reason we
could have for doing so. Aristotle said that this was common knowledge, and it
seems that Buddhist authors, when they are documenting or criticizing human
foibles, take it as a clear fact too.8 Although the Buddhist will differ with us on
some of the details of what is or isn’t painful or seamy, there is a recurrent
argumentation in texts like A¯ryadeva’s Catuh: s´ataka, in Na¯ga¯rjuna’s Ratna¯valı¯ and
in the Bodhicarya¯vata¯ra of S´a¯ntideva, to the effect that Buddhist practitioners, and
indeed average people if they were to reflect a bit, actually know well that most of
their actions are worse courses. A¯ryadeva (2nd–3rd century CE) for example,
consecrates his first four chapters to a famous series of four ‘‘illusions’’ (viparya¯sa)
that are supposedly present in varying degrees in the troubled minds of Buddhist
practitioners: thus Buddhists are convinced that things are impermanent but also
tenaciously and wrongly hold them to be permanent, what is actually painful is held
to be pleasant, unclean things are held to be clean, and selfless things are held to
have selves (Lang 2003, 1986).9 The logic in the treatment of these illusions is
always the same: people are self-deceived; they know that permanence, cleanliness,
selves, etc. are illusions and yet somehow think the exact opposite and act for the
worse. S´a¯ntideva adopts a first-person perspective and again and again engages in
extensive arguments with himself, contrasting fundamental Buddhist truths and
8 Cf. Wiggins (1998, pp. 239–240): ‘‘Almost anyone not under the influence of theory will say that, when
a person is weak-willed, he intentionally chooses that which he knows or believes to be the worse course
of action when he could choose the better course. … But there are philosophers of mind and moral
philosophers who have felt a strong theoretical compulsion to rewrite the description, rather than allow
the phenomenon of weakness of will to appear as an incontrovertible refutation of the theories of mind or
morality that they are committed to defend.’’
9 For the canonical schema of four viparya¯sa, see Abhidharmakos´abha¯s:ya ad V.8, translation de la
Valle´e Poussin, tome IV, p. 21.
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norms which he (in some sense) knows with the opposite thought patterns of his
own divided mind.
To take two typical verses:
Why, mind, do you protect this carcass, identifying with it? If it is really separate from you, then
what loss is its decay to you?
O Fool! You do not identify with a wooden doll even when it is pure. So why do you guard this
festering contraption made of filth? (Translation in Crosby and Skilton 1996, p. 39)
There are many other such descriptions of seemingly inexplicable odd
behaviour and incoherence: Dharmapa¯la, for example, illustrates the ‘‘strangeness
of the world’’, with a list of ten ‘‘hard to fathom things’’ (Chinese: nan ce), some
of which (such as people coveting money all the while renouncing the world) are
suggestive of akrasia (Translated in Tillemans 1990, vol. 1, pp. 171–172). Other
authors, especially the writers on monastic discipline (vinaya), describe in
considerable detail the bizarreries of celibate individuals, who subscribe to the
monastic code but nonetheless pursue (alas, often intentionally, I suppose) quite
disturbing deviations from the rules. No need to elaborate further. In any case,
there seems to be ample information in texts documenting people acting in a way
that they knew or strongly believed to be wrong. In fact, there are more complex
potential cases of akrasia where belief in errors is seen as inescapable and even
necessary. These ‘‘positive’’ cases arise, not in ethical contexts, but rather in
Buddhist metaphysics and philosophy of language. However, a discussion of these
error-theories of universals and conventional truths, even though they may well be
seen as a peculiar advocacy of epistemic akrasia, would take us too far into other
matters (see Tillemans 2004).
Significant is that both S´a¯ntideva and Dharmapa¯la express deep puzzlement
about why people do the things they do against their better judgment. But what are
these two writers puzzled about and what kind of an answer might they have
expected to receive, if any? One quick, and unsatisfying, response would be to say
that S´a¯ntideva wasn’t actually puzzled at all—his questions were just repeated
exhortations to himself to practice Buddhism. But this unfortunately amounts to
eliminating the divided mind that S´a¯ntideva reveals throughout so much of the
Bodhicarya¯vata¯ra: instead of a mind in conflict, we would have an essentially
indolent figure who provides himself with a series of rhetorical goads. Charity
demands that we take S´a¯ntideva’s ‘‘Why?’’ more seriously.
Let me begin with what I think is the kind of answer that S´a¯ntideva is probably
not seeking. He and most other people who puzzle about why they choose worse
courses (be they 8th Century Indian Buddhists or 20th Century country and western
singers) are usually not seeking purely causal explanations.10 Indeed, if the repeated
‘‘why?’’ (kasma¯t) and ‘‘how is it possible?’’ questions that we find so often in the
Bodhicarya¯vata¯ra were to be taken as the search for a psychological explanation
identifying causal factors that gave rise to odd behaviour and beliefs, a Buddhist
should have little difficulty in coming up with answers. Those answers might be
intricate, especially given Buddhism’s detailed discussions of karma, mental factors
10 I am of course once again thinking of that great Texan akrates, Lyle Lovett.
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(caitta), dependent arising (pratı¯tyasamutpa¯da), and the other elaborations of
mental causality found in Abhidharma or Prama¯n:a literature, typically in connection
with the question of the origin of suffering. But the answers would be forthcoming
and relatively unproblematic.
In the West or in the East there is no shortage of causal explanation as to what
makes people go against their better judgment: e.g., the passions constrain people to
do what they don’t want to do, much like external force; or the psychological force
of better judgment is over-powered by the force of temptation; vigilance and
mindfulness are too weak against the passions; or better judgment is no match for
the strength of longstanding habits and ingrained tendencies to go against it, and so
and on and so forth. Many of these causal explanations, and particularly the appeal
to the causality of longstanding tendencies (va¯sana¯), are at one point or another
invoked by Buddhists to explain psychologically how it happens that we do or think
things we also know to be worse choices or errors. Indeed talk of deeply ingrained
tendencies, or more exactly ‘‘beginningless tendencies’’ (ana¯dika¯lava¯sana¯), is such
a Buddhist cliche´ that if S´a¯ntideva or another Buddhist had simply wanted a causal
account of why people go against their better judgment, it would be hard to see why
any puzzlement would have arisen at all. I think it is clear that a causal explanation
along the lines of ‘‘Buddhist psychology’’ is not primarily what is being sought: it is
just too readily available.
Nor would such Buddhist psychology settle the puzzlement: invoking that type
of explanation largely misses the point. Generally, when people are perplexed
about why they do the things they do, they are asking for reasons and not just
mere causes, reasons that enable them to make sense of actions by seeing them as
fitting into a pattern of thought and action that is rational and consistent. Such is, I
maintain, also what seems to lie behind S´a¯ntideva’s ‘‘why?’’ The puzzlement
comes from the following: while S´a¯ntideva had what were for him good Buddhist
reasons for not identifying with his body and not cherishing it, and he no doubt
had all-too-human reasons for nonetheless protecting his body, he found himself
with no reasons at all for pursuing a course of action (i.e., protecting his body)
that he sincerely and deeply believed to be worse over one that he thought to be
better. This is indeed the hallmark of akrasia: the actor cannot satisfactorily
understand himself in reasoned terms; although he may be able to give causal
accounts and may perhaps even be a determinist in maintaining that all his actions
and thoughts are somehow caused by events in the past, he cannot give a reason
that would entail that, all things considered, he should pursue what he knows to be
the worse course.11 This seems to correspond to S´a¯ntideva’s predicament, for the
Bodhicarya¯vata¯ra is above all an intense, almost obsessive, introspection of a
thinker perplexed at having no reasons to justify his rejection of what he thinks
best and true.
11 The central idea is that of Davidson, encapsulated in one of the three quotations with which we began
this article. See the elaboration in Davidson (l980, p. 42).
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4 Dismissals
So much for Buddhist observations and recognition of the oh-so-common
phenomena of akrasia. Theorizing about how such phenomena are possible—i.e.,
making a place for the akratic in one’s theoretical account of human thought and
action—is quite another matter, especially given the ‘‘standard conception’’ of
rationality that Indo-Tibetan scholastic Buddhist thinkers promote. I think that many
Buddhists, in reflecting theoretically, are reluctant to acknowledge that people’s
thought and actions can be as akratic as they seem to be and feel that appearance of
akrasia needs to be explained away. I can see three basic theoretical strategies that
are in accord with broad lines of Buddhist scholastic texts and popular teachings,
two that would dismiss all akrasia as only apparent and one that would acknowledge
it and even provide the beginning of an account of how it is possible. Each involves,
inter alia, an interpretation of the key Buddhist idea that ignorance (avidya¯)
underlies moral and epistemic faults. We begin with the two dismissals.
One potential Buddhist strategy to dispel appearance of akrasia can be elaborated
as follows: in the S´a¯ntideva-style examples, four illusions and other such cases, a
Buddhist is not actually in conflict with his own clear and better understanding,
because the latter is for all intents and purposes nonexistent, or too fleeting, too
vague, and hence cannot enter into any such conflict. In short, there is no
inconsistency between the principles that a Buddhist holds and the opposing beliefs
that seem to guide how he actually behaves, because there is no real understanding
of the relevant Buddhist principles at all. The would-be akrates might possibly pay
lip-service to those ideas and even claim that he masters them, but in fact he doesn’t
understand them in a way that could be said to be in genuine conflict with anything.
The culprit, to put it in Buddhist terms, is the mental factor of ignorance (avidya¯)
that is at the root of the errors and misdeeds that keep sentient beings bound to the
cycle of suffering and reincarnation, i.e., sam: sa¯ra; ignorance clouds the mind so that
understanding is weakened. Applied in a thorough-going fashion this dismissal
leads to a doctrine of pure rationality a` la Socrates: no akrasia, no inconsistency, just
the all-present ‘‘darkness of ignorance’’ (avidya¯ndhaka¯ra): we’re left with people
(Buddhists or otherwise) who are rational and consistent, but who, in their dullness,
don’t actually grasp the points at issue—a not very flattering depiction of serious,
profound thinkers, like S´a¯ntideva and others, who have consecrated their lives to
understanding Buddhist philosophy.
Of course, this image of avidya¯ as andhaka¯ra, gloom-making, is amply attested
in Buddhist canonical literature, as are numerous other similar metaphors: ignorance
as a cloud, an obscuration, a veil, fog, an eye disease. Preponderance of such
imagery might seem to suggest that the ignorance that leads us astray was invariably
interpreted as an unknowing that deprived people of better judgment, making them
into ‘‘children’’ (ba¯la) and ‘‘fools’’ (mu¯rkhajana). And if that was all there was to it,
then the ‘‘ignorance dismissal’’ would indeed put a fast end to any debate about
akrasia, self-deception, and irrationality. To use an Aristotelian image, people
invoking ethical or philosophical principles would be like drunkards reciting verses
of Empedocles that they didn’t understand: such people might be stupefied, but they
would not be akratic, nor would they be irrational in any interesting way.
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The second potential dismissal of akrasia is a variant upon the first. It could be
summarized as follows: people don’t act against what they think best; due to
ignorance and delusions like self-grasping, they not only don’t understand what is
best, but erroneously believe that actions based on stinginess, indulgence in desires,
and so forth are not the worse courses, but are the best courses for them in that they will
maximize utility. Similarly for cases suggestive of epistemic akrasia and self-decep-
tion: people do not actually believe that permanence, the existence of selves, etc., are
illusions, but believe they are real facts. In short, people may again pay lip-service to
Buddhist moral and philosophical principles, but they believe in something else that
will maximize their own utility and that is why they pursue it. The first type of
dismissal was based on people simply not understanding Buddhist principles and thus
not adequately understanding what the best course of action was. The second had the
additional feature that people would not actually believe that the worse course was
worse, because ignorance made them take the false and worse for the true and best. The
consequence of the second is in any case another variant on the Socratic principle of
pure rationality: people would never intentionally pursue what they genuinely knew to
be worse courses and would never believe what they knew to be false.
Who subscribes to pure rationality and its resultant dismissals of semblances of
akrasia? It is above all to be found in contemporary interpretations of Buddhism as an
‘‘art of happiness,’’ or even a ‘‘science of happiness,’’ interpretations that often
advance a position that goes strikingly in the direction of pure rationality and hence a
dismissal of phenomena like akrasia. Indeed, what seems presupposed as a
philosophy of action in this burgeoning literature, and is admittedly articulated with
varying degrees of clarity and explicitness, is something that we can formulate along
the following lines: sentient beings, by nature, will act in a way that they think
maximizes their happiness; their pursuit of happiness, however, is misguided and
regularly leads them to unfortunate actions because they are so deeply ignorant about
what happiness really is and what leads to it.12 This approach has no room for akrasia
and precludes that there are people whose minds are divided between genuine better
judgments of what is valuable and intentional pursuit of courses known to be worse.
One thing that needs to be made clear: Buddhism as a rational ‘‘art/science of
happiness’’ is itself a thoroughly modern interpretation of Buddhism, an attempt at
elaborating a Buddhist ethical philosophy that applies a broadly speaking utilitarian
approach as a master-argument to decide courses of action. Why such a philosophy
has been promoted and why it might seem attractive is beyond the scope of this
paper, but would involve a number of considerations about how certain Buddhists
have seen their religion’s possible role in the world and its compatibility with
modernity. In any case, the textual sources in Buddhism significantly underdetermine
12 See Ricard (2006, pp. 26–27): ‘‘However we go about looking for it, and whether we call it joy or duty,
passion or contentment, isn’t happiness the goal of all goals? … Anyone who says otherwise doesn’t
really know what he wants; he is simply seeking happiness under another name.’’ An appeal to the self-
evidence of the fact that people do what they do because they rationally (but misguidedly) calculate it will
maximize their happiness is clearly found in a recent article by the American monk, Thanissaro Bhikkhu
(2006). On p. 43 we are provided with the following diagnosis of what underlies attachment to things like
alcohol: ‘‘… in your calculation, the immediate pleasure derived from the alcohol outweighs the long-
term damage it’s doing to your life.…We’re attached to things and actions, not because of what we think
they are but because of what we think they can do for our happiness.’’
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this currently promoted picture of Buddhist ethics as utilitarian.13 Nor is there, as far
as I can see, clear evidence in classical Buddhist literature in favour of the
background principle that people will invariably act in the way they think, all things
considered, to be most conducive to their happiness/utility. On the contrary, as we’ve
seen in Sect. 3, we seem to have ample evidence that influential Buddhist authors
recognize that certain people in pursuing worse-courses do not act in that way: they
act in a way that they themselves understand very well leads to less overall happiness
for themselves, and a fortiori less happiness for others. Indeed, following the
Bodhicarya¯vata¯ra that is virtually the rule for thoughtful people embarking upon
Buddhist practice. In what follows, we will seek to develop interpretations of
Buddhist theoretical notions, like avidya¯ and others, which make such conflict
possible and do not explain away those important phenomena in favour of pure
rationality.14
There are, in Buddhist philosophical literature, the makings of a more complex
and rich theoretical account of akrasia, one that: (a) interprets ignorance as an active
defiled intelligence, rather than a mere unknowing; (b) allows for conflicting
networks of reasoning in different sub-systems, or different ‘‘compartments’’, of
consciousness; (c) develops a theory of personal identity and responsibility so that
compartmentalized mental states are still attributable to one agent. All these themes
are present in writings of major Maha¯ya¯nist Buddhist authors and in combination
they give an account of human thought and behaviour in which there will be a
considerable role for the all too human phenomena of akrasia in its various forms. In
the remainder of this article, I’ll sketch out some observations on each such theme in
Buddhism. Hopefully the outlines of a more thorough treatment will become visible.
5 Ignorance as Defiled Intelligence
If a Buddhist wishes to defend pure rationality come what may, no doubt the easiest
route for him, as we saw, is to generalize the role of ignorance as a simple unknowing:
there are never any real cases of akrasia; the would-be akrates always turns out to be
ignorant of what is best and true. While many Buddhists did take ignorance in that
way, that is, as a non-understanding (apratipatti), it is important to note that many
other major Buddhist philosophers, like the 7th Century author, Dharmakı¯rti, and the
author(s) of the Yoga¯ca¯rabhu¯mi, did not see the ignorance that underlies sam: sa¯ra as a
mere absence of understanding, but as a very tenacious and even reasoned mis-
understanding (vipratipatti). They explained it as being the wrong view that reifies
persons, i.e., satka¯yadr: s: t: i, or a ‘‘defiled intelligence’’ (klis: t: a¯ prajn˜a¯). I quote a relevant
passage from Dharmakı¯rti’s Prama¯n: ava¯rttika and Svavr: tti (auto-commentary) in full:
What then is the source of these [moral] faults so that they are abandoned due to the repeated
cultivation of its antidote?
13 On Buddhist ethics as virtue ethics rather than utilitarianism, see Keown (2001). Buddhists’ narratives
of dilemmas would seem to show that they, like most of us, are faced with what Thomas Nagel calls a
‘‘fragmentation of value’’, i.e. competing values that come into conflict, and no single criterion to decide
everything (Nagel 1979, Ch. 9).
14 Cf. Wiggins’ remarks cited in footnote 8 above. To persist in saying that S´a¯ntideva just cannot actually
know or believe such truths is tantamount to a refusal to allow challenges to a faulty background theory.
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The genesis of all the [different] kinds of faults is due to the false view that reifies the person
(satka¯yadars´ana). This constitutes ignorance (avidya¯); the attachment to the [I and the mine] is
based on that. From that [attachment] come hatred and [all] the rest [of the moral faults]. 222
Indeed if someone sees that there is no I and no mine, then, lacking [such] a belief, he will not be
attached to anything. Nor will a detached person feel hatred for anything, for no-one has any
[hatred] for what is harmless to himself and his possessions or prevents harm [to them]. Thus, the
view reifying the self, which came about due to repeated cultivation of [a view] of the same
general kind, leads to the view of there being a ‘‘mine’’, and these two [views] to attachment to the
[I and mine], and [finally] that [leads] to hatred and [all] the rest [of the moral faults]. That is why
all faults arise from the false view that reifies the person. And it is precisely that [view] that we
term ‘ignorance’ (ajn˜a¯na).15
In short, the necessary condition for the perpetuation of the world of suffering, i.e.,
sam: sa¯ra, is ignorance taken as being a defiled intelligence reifying persons: this leads to
the mistaken belief/apprehension that there is a substantial self and its possessions, to
the related attitudes of self-protection and aggression, and finally, when these attitudes
prevail, to the resultant worse-course behaviour, like stinginess, anger, and indulgence
in desires, etc. Other thinkers, of a Madhyamaka orientation, like Candrakı¯rti and Tsong
kha pa, also speak of active, intelligent, misconstruing, rather than just dullness: thus
satya¯bhima¯na (the attachment that things are real), grasping at the real (bden ‘dzin), etc.
are underlying necessary conditions for our choosing worse alternatives.16
For philosophers who see sam: sa¯ra as thus rooted in an active and defiled type of
intelligence, rather than a simple unknowing of what is best, the facile Socratic
‘‘ignorance defense’’ for pure rationality is not readily available: there is, rather, a clash
between strongly held ways of thinking. This leaves the route open for Buddhists to say
that well-cultivated practitioners, like S´a¯ntideva, could know they are wrong in pursuing
stinginess, anger, and other passions, and in believing in permanence, cleanliness,
selves, etc. They could know those things, though their defiled intelligence strongly
believes the opposite and leads them to act upon what they know to be wrong.
6 Compartmentalization and Consistency
When we speak of an akrates going against his own better judgment, we easily attribute
to him a type of inconsistency. But does that mean that an akrates who knows that
generosity is the best course of action but nonetheless pursues his own stingy
self-interest explicitly thinks to himself that one and the same action is both good and
not good? Does he endorse a conjunction of a proposition and its negation? This seems
quite unlikely and would be perilously close to what Candrakı¯rti calls simply ‘‘being
15 Prama¯n: ava¯rttika I, 222 and Svavr: tti (ed. Gnoli 1960, p. 111): kah: punar es: a¯m: dos: a¯na¯m: prabhavo
yatpratipaks: a¯bhya¯sa¯t prahı¯yante/sarva¯sa¯m: dos:aja¯tı¯na¯m: ja¯tih: satka¯yadars´ana¯t//sa¯ avidya¯ tatra tatsnehas
tasma¯d dves: a¯disambhavah: //222//na hi na¯ham: na mameti pas´yatah: parigraham antaren: a kvacit snehah: /na
ca¯nanura¯gin: ah: kvacid dves:ah: /a¯tma¯tmı¯ya¯nuparodhiny uparodhapratigha¯tini ca tadabha¯va¯t/tasma¯t
sama¯naja¯tı¯ya¯bhya¯sajam a¯tmadars´anam a¯tmı¯yagraham: prasu¯te/tau ca tatsneham: sa ca dves: a¯dı¯n iti
satka¯yadars´anaja¯h: sarvados: a¯h: /tad eva ca ajn˜a¯nam ity ucyate/.
16 For references to the two senses of ignorance in Candrakı¯rti’s Pan˜caskandhaprakaran: a and to ‘‘defiled
intelligence’’ in the Yoga¯ca¯rabhu¯mi, see Seyfort Ruegg (2002, n. 148). For satya¯bhima¯na, see
Candrakı¯rti’s Madhyamaka¯vata¯rabha¯s:ya ad Madhyamaka¯vata¯ra VI.28, translation de la Valle´e Poussin
(1910, pp. 304–305).
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demented’’, ‘‘out of one’s mind’’ (unmattaka), rather than being a sane worldling in a
complex tension between better judgment and defiled forms of intelligence.
Now for the Buddhist, as for Donald Davidson and many other theorists about
akrasia, the way back from such a radical form of irrationality is compartmentalization
of mind: instead of one and the same mind or subject holding two opposing ideas or
networks of ideas—a puzzling phenomenon indeed—there are supposedly many
semi-autonomous cognitive sub-systems each having their own beliefs, with no
substantial person linking them together.17 I think the most plausible reconstruction of
the position found in Prama¯n: ava¯rttika and other key texts
18 would be as follows:
ignorance-qua-defiled intelligence is regularly depicted in Buddhist literature as
creating a network of reasonings (e.g., ‘‘This is me’’, ‘‘This is mine’’, ‘‘This is hence
essential to my happiness’’, etc.) with a great deal of internal cohesion and leading to a
coherent series of decisions to act in certain fashions (e.g., ‘‘I should defend this’’, ‘‘I
will be aggressive to someone who threatens me in this respect,’’ etc.). It is this
network of reasonings and actions that leads to conflict with a competing ensemble of
beliefs that there is no real I, no need to defend it, etc. The akrates, Buddhist or
otherwise, could be depicted as caught between networks of ideas leading to him
endorse p from the perspective of one such network and not-p from the other, but there
would be no perspective from which he endorsed both p and not-p. The inconsistency
that he endorses, if any, is thus of a weaker ‘‘non-adjunctive’’ sort; and that need not be
the same as believing the conjunction p and not-p; he need not endorse the
considerably stronger inconsistency that something is both good and not good.19
7 The Self
Of course, this is not the end of the story: there are other major philosophical
hurdles that the Buddhist must cross. Let me sketch out two of them.
First, seeing the mind as a number of sub-systems is, as is often stressed in the
East and in the West, particularly vulnerable to the critique that thoughts, desires,
intentions and so forth would not end up being attributed to the whole person, i.e., to
a unified subject that we refer to by ‘‘I’’.20 Buddhists were certainly aware of that
17 These components are mental elements (dharma) classified into ‘‘minds’’ (citta) and ‘‘mental factors’’
(caitta)—this is the sort of thing that is explained in extraordinary detail in scholastic texts like the
Abhidharmakos´a and so many others of the Abhidharma genre. Fragmentation of the mind into such
components is also explained, or presupposed, in Yoga¯ca¯ra and Madhyamaka Buddhism, even if the
positions on the ontological status of such elements will differ from that of the Abhidharma.
Compartmentalization is, in short, part of basic Buddhism.
18 See the passage from Prama¯n: ava¯rttikasvavr: tti quoted in Sect. 5.
19 Cf. Davidson (2004b, p. 217): ‘‘The distinction we need here is between believing contradictory
propositions and believing a contradiction, between believing that p and believing that not-p on the one
hand, and believing that (p and not-p) on the other.’’ I have taken up Buddhist uses of non-adjunctive
inconsistencies in some detail in ‘‘How do Ma¯dhyamikas Think? Notes on Jay Garfield, Graham Priest
and Paraconsistency,’’ forthcoming in the papers of the BILAP (Buddhism in Logic and Analytic
Philosophy) conference in Cambridge, 2005, ed. Jay Garfield, Mario D’Amato and Tom Tillemans. One
could even weaken the inconsistency further by saying, with Wiggins, that perspectives may embody
incommensurable values.
20 The objection is that of the Brahmanical schools. But see also Davidson (2004a, p. 171) for a similar
objection.
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problem and had their makings of a reply. The main thrust of this philosophy, either
in the Abhidharma, in Yoga¯ca¯ra or in Madhyamaka, is always that talk of the unity
of the knowing subject is only a customary truth (sam: vr: tisatya), one due to worldly
transactions (vyavaha¯ra)—ascription of mental states to ‘‘whole persons’’ thus has
to be explained without ascribing these states to a real I that owns them. This is not
the place to go into an extensive treatment of Buddhist views on personal identity—
others, like Mark Siderits, have taken this up in detail, looking especially at the
Buddhist-inspired reductionism of Derek Parfit as well as Madhyamaka views on
selflessness (Siderits 2003). Suffice it to say here that some such account of the
unreality of substantial selves would seem to be indispensable if the Buddhist
compartmentalist, or the thoroughgoing Davidsonian for that matter, is to allow for
phenomena like akrasia.
Second, even if one does follow the Buddhist in relegating the unifying ‘‘I’’ to
mere customary truth, what is also crucially necessary for philosophers who accept
compartmentalization is an account of some kind of ‘‘panoptical’’ perspective, so
that some or many of the mental sub-systems are transparent and accessible to each
other.21 Lacking some such transparency and integrating perspective, a thinker like
S´a¯ntideva would end up too divided to be perturbed at all by the conflicts between
his mental states. Now, it may be that certain Buddhist philosophers, like
Dharmakı¯rti, can fulfill that requirement for integration with their idea that every
mental state is also aware of itself, and that this ‘‘reflexive awareness’’
(svasam: vedana) can provide the needed panoptical perspective. However, it is
not sufficiently clear to me how his account would work here, for the reflexive
awarenesses of mental states are also taken to be individual and thus quite separate
from each other. Curiously enough, it was not actually the Buddhist followers of
Dharmakı¯rti who explicitly used ‘‘reflexive awareness’’ to integrate otherwise
overly separate mental components. It was their philosophical cousins and rivals,
the Kashmiri Shaivites, Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta, who accepted much of the
basic scheme of Dharmakı¯rti’s partitioning of the mind, but then invoked a unitary
‘‘reflexive awareness’’ to give the panoptical perspective that would permit separate
components to communicate (see Torella 2007).22 The idea may hold promise for
rendering the divided mental sub-systems of the akrates transparent too.
8 Final Remarks
Buddhist philosophy of mind, in addition to compartmentalization, frequently
advocates a type of stratification of the mental into conscious and unconscious
strata. Indeed, a number of years ago the late Gadjin Nagao published an article in
21 The ideas of a ‘‘panoptical scanner’’ and ‘‘transparency’’ are developed by Rorty (1988).
22 Utpaladeva takes as an example the case of the two separate cognitions in Dharmakı¯rti’s account of
non-perception (anupalabdhi) of a jar, i.e., the cognition of an empty place, like a table, and the cognition
of it being devoid of jars. Lacking a type of panoptical scanner, i.e., a unitary svasam: vedana that grasps
both, the first cognition could not lead to the second. The example is generalized by the Shaivite to show
that all separate cognitions can ‘‘communicate’’ with each other and enter into networks because of this
illuminating feature of consciousness.
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the Felicitation Volume for Jacques May in which he tried to look at the Buddhist
a¯layavijn˜a¯na (the storehouse consciousness) as a kind of unconscious in depth
psychology, underlying the conscious mind, or pravr: ttivijn˜a¯na (Nagao 1992).
Recently William Waldron has taken a similar tack with a book on the a¯layavijn˜a¯na
(‘‘fundamental consciousness’’, or more literally ‘‘storehouse consciousness’’)
entitled The Buddhist Unconscious (Waldron 2003). Whether we see Buddhist
enlightenment in Yoga¯ca¯ra terms as a ‘‘revolutionary perspective’’ (para¯vr: tti) on the
a¯layavijn˜a¯na or along the Madhyamaka lines of an elimination of sentient beings’
‘‘inborn grasping at things being real’’, progress on the Buddhist path invariably
involves bringing error to the ever-increasing light of day. What place does akrasia
have here?
To put things in rough and ready terms, some thoughts—like the deepest, or
innate (sahaja), grasping at a real self and the subtle forms of grasping at
permanence and other illusions (viparya¯sa)—could indeed be called ‘‘unconscious’’
in the sense that though a person thinks that p, he might not have the second order
understanding that he thinks p (McGinn 1979), or if he did, he might not have any
understanding of the extent of its hold on his conscious life. When these thoughts
are unconscious, akrasia would not occur in connection with them, for there is no
question at this time of knowing what is best but nonetheless consciously/
intentionally choosing to do or think otherwise. However, as a practitioner becomes
more and more familiar with his own mind and understands better its illusions, it
seems that akrasia-like conflict becomes acute. Indeed, at the first stages (bhu¯mi) of
a Maha¯ya¯nist’s spiritual advancement, the post-meditative (rjes thob; pr: s: t:halabdha)
consciousness is said to be under the influence of tendencies to ‘‘grasp at the real’’
(bden ‘dzin) and to give rise to passions, i.e., what the scholastic refers to as
kles´a¯varan: a, or ‘‘obscuration due to the passions’’. Even after their elimination after
the seventh bhu¯mi, the practitioner is still subject to a subtle obscuration, viz., that
‘‘phenomena appear [to him] as real’’ (bden snang). These are errors earlier realized
to be wrong during meditative absorptions, but that continue to reappear when the
practitioner interracts with the world. The tension between meditative perspectives
and post-meditative reentry into the world thus remains, albeit in ever more
attenuated forms, until full buddhahood. What is disturbing—just as I think it was
for S´a¯ntideva—is that some type of akrasia in all its puzzling urgency seems to be
the price of spiritual progress along the Buddhist path.
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